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Artificial Intelligence and 
the Challenges of Workplace 
Discrimination and Privacy
Pauline T. Kim* & Matthew T. Bodie**
Introduction
The term artificial intelligence (AI) was coined in the 1950s, but 
the concept has piqued humanity’s interest both before and since.1 
Initially relegated to science fiction and futuristic fantasies, recent 
technological leaps have made AI commonplace. We rely on these sys-
tems every day when we check the weather, read the news, navigate 
voice mail, or get directions. These systems also increasingly guide or 
replace human decision-making in important domains like medical 
care, criminal law enforcement, finance, and employment. These devel-
opments raise a number of societal challenges, and numerous scholars 
have begun to tackle concerns over the appropriate role of algorithmic 
decision-making in our society.2
In the workplace setting, employers are increasingly relying on 
artificially intelligent systems to recruit, select, and manage their 
workforces. These developments have raised fears that these systems 
may subject workers to discriminatory, invasive, or otherwise unfair 
treatment. In this article, we review those concerns and provide an 
overview of how current laws may apply, focusing on two particular 
* Daniel Noyes Kirby Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law, St. 
Louis, Missouri.
** Callis Family Professor and Co-Director, Wefel Center for Employment Law, Saint 
Louis University School of Law. This article originated in presentations at the 72nd 
Annual Conference on Labor, “AI and Automation—Impact on Work and Workers,” at the 
NYU Center for Labor and Employment Law. Thanks to Laurie Berke-Weiss, Heather 
Egan Sussman, and Michael Gray for serving as commentators on our panel.
1. Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 u.c. daVis 
L. rEV. 399, 401 (2017).
2. See Deborah Hellman, Measuring Algorithmic Fairness, 106 Va. L. rEV. 811, 
813–14 (2020) (“The use of algorithms, and in particular their connection with machine 
learning and artificial intelligence, has attracted significant attention in the legal liter-
ature as well.”). For a small sampling of the literature, see frank pasquaLE, thE bLack 
boX sociEty (2015); Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Access to Algorithms, 88 fordham L. rEV. 1265 
(2020); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for 
Automated Predictions, 89 wash. L. rEV. 1 (2014); Aziz Z. Huq, A Right to a Human Deci-
sion, 106 Va. L. rEV. 611, 613 (2020); Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of 
Artificial Intelligence, 66 ucLa L. rEV. 54 (2019); David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with 
the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 u.c. daVis L. 
rEV. 653, 655 (2017).
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problems: discrimination on the basis of protected characteristics like 
race, sex, or disability, and the invasion of workers’ privacy engendered 
by workplace AI systems. Part I provides a brief background on the 
nature of AI and its growing role in the workplace. Part II discusses 
the ways in which relying on AI to make personnel decisions can pro-
duce discriminatory outcomes and how current law might apply. Part 
III explores how these data-driven systems may threaten workers’ 
interests in privacy and autonomy, and considers the extent to which 
existing legal frameworks address these concerns. It also describes the 
European Union’s much more restrictive regime as a useful compara-
tor. This article argues that the growing use of AI at work raises signif-
icant policy concerns about discrimination, privacy, and autonomy that 
are not adequately addressed by current law.
I. AI and the Workplace
The term artificial intelligence is difficult to define crisply and is 
often used interchangeably with other terms such as machine learn-
ing, algorithmic decision-making, and automated decision-making.3 
Although these terms have somewhat different technical meanings, in 
this article we use the term AI loosely to refer to systems that leverage 
data-rich inputs and computational techniques to make predictions 
that either aid or replace human decision-making. These tools are built 
by analyzing large amounts of data to extract patterns and then using 
those patterns to predict outcomes in new cases or situations. Some 
forms of AI use machine learning techniques, which allow a program to 
learn from incoming data over time without humans actively structur-
ing the process. AI systems have the ability to generate insights that 
are not accessible based on ordinary human observation, and the more 
complex systems may generate results that are not fully explainable or 
understandable, even by their human creators.4
Early efforts at artificial intelligence endeavored to make machines 
into the equivalent of humans, with the ability to exercise judgment 
3. Calo, supra note 1, at 404 (defining AI as “a set of techniques aimed at approxi-
mating some aspect of human or animal cognition using machines” and explaining that 
“[t]here is no straightforward, consensus definition of artificial intelligence”); Ashley 
Deeks, The Judicial Demand for Explainable Artificial Intelligence, 119 coLum. L. rEV. 
1829, 1832 (2019) (“Artificial intelligence is a notoriously capacious and slippery term.”); 
see Commission White Paper on Artificial Intelligence—A European Approach to Excellence 
and Trust, COM (2020) 65 final (Feb. 19, 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files 
/commission-white-paper-artificial-intelligence-feb2020_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/P3KG 
-UFEV] (“Simply put, AI is a collection of technologies that combine data, algorithms and 
computing power.”).
4. Calo, supra note 1, at 402 (noting that “a vast increase in computational power 
and access to training data has led to practical breakthroughs in machine learning, a 
singularly important branch of AI”); Deeks, supra note 3, at 1829 (“A recurrent concern 
about machine learning algorithms is that they operate as ‘black boxes.’”).
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in a variety of contexts.5 These efforts to create a “general” AI have 
largely failed.6 However, there have been great successes in narrow 
AI—namely, the application of artificial intelligence to a particular 
problem or context.7 Familiar examples of AI breakthroughs include 
programs that play games such as chess and Go; speech-recognition 
programs that translate speech to text; and spam filters for email 
accounts.8 Increasingly, AI systems are being used in social domains 
as well—for example, to make decisions regarding policing, bail, credit, 
and employment.9 As these AI tools are deployed in arenas with signif-
icant human and societal impacts, concerns have been raised about the 
fairness, accountability, and transparency of these systems.10 Fairness 
centers on the risk of “discriminatory or unjust impacts when compar-
ing across different demographics or affected communities and indi-
viduals.”11 Accountability refers to the need to take responsibility for 
the use of AI and the effects of that use, including the need to mitigate 
negative impacts on society.12 Transparency concerns relate to failures 
to disclose when AI is used to make decisions and to explain how it 
reaches those decisions.13 
The use of AI in the workplace raises specific apprehensions. Much 
recent attention has focused on whether workers will be replaced by 
AI or other new forms of technology, such as automation and robotics.14 
 5. futurE of priVacy forum, thE priVacy EXpErt’s guidE to artificiaL intELLigEncE 
and machinE LEarning 5 (2018), https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/FPF_Artificial 
-Intelligence_Digital.pdf [https://perma.cc/949W-QHL4] [hereinafter fpf EXpErt’s guidE].
 6. See id. at 5–6.
 7. Id. at 6; Calo, supra note 1, at 405 (“An important consequence of the shift was 
that researchers began to try to solve specific problems or master particular ‘domains,’ 
such as converting speech to text or playing chess, instead of pursuing a holistic intelli-
gence capable of performing every cognitive task within one system.”).
 8. fpf EXpErt’s guidE, supra note 5, at 6; Alison DeNisco Rayome, Why IBM’s 
Speech Recognition Breakthrough Matters for AI and IoT, tEchrEpubLic (Mar. 13, 2017, 
9:39 AM), https://www.techrepublic.com/article/why-ibms-speech-recognition-break-
through-matters-for-ai-and-iot [https://perma.cc/F9SH-HSQF]. The speed of advance-
ment just in the last five years has taken some observers by surprise. See Cynthia 
Estlund, What Should We Do After Work? Automation and Employment Law, 128 yaLE 
L.J. 254, 265–66 (2018) (discussing the leap forward in natural language translation in 
2016).
 9. See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, Artificial Intelligence and Policing: Hints in the Car-
penter Decision, 16 ohio st. J. crim. L. 281, 283–84 (2018); Tom C.W. Lin, Artificial Intel-
ligence, Finance, and the Law, 88 fordham L. rEV. 531, 532 (2019); William Magnuson, 
Artificial Financial Intelligence, 10 harV. bus. L. rEV. 337, 340–41 (2020); Andrew D. 
Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 ga. L. rEV. 109, 113–14 (2017); Crystal 
S. Yang & Will Dobbie, Equal Protection Under Algorithms: A New Statistical and Legal 
Framework, 119 mich. L. rEV. 291 (2020).
10. pasquaLE, supra note 2, at 3–11; Citron & Pasquale, supra note 2. 
11. FPF EXpErt’s guidE, supra note 5, at 22. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. See Erik brynJoLfsson & andrEw mcafEE, thE sEcond machinE agE: work, 
progrEss, and prospErity in a timE of briLLiant tEchnoLogiEs 126–28 (2014); Frank 
Pasquale, Data-Informed Duties in AI Development, 119 coLum. L. rEV. 1917, 1917 (2019) 
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Worry about technology replacing human labor is not new, but there is 
a lively ongoing debate about whether advances in AI will cause dis-
ruptions on a greater scale than in the past.15 Although this question 
is clearly important, this article focuses instead on the policy concerns 
that arise when employers use AI tools to manage workers, rather than 
replace them.
Employers have adopted artificial intelligence systems to assist in 
a variety of personnel and management functions.16 AI tools are used 
to screen employment applicants and evaluate potential candidates for 
positions.17 Employers have also used AI to determine which employees 
might be more likely to leave the company. Data analytics have found 
correlations between a higher risk of flight and such factors as time 
interacting with colleagues, meeting attendance, and waiver of ben-
efits coverage.18 Employers can then use these predictions to make a 
stronger effort at retention or to steer likely-to-depart employees away 
from sensitive projects. Across the board, employers are using AI to 
help manage their workforce—in some cases, even doing the work of 
management.19 This includes turning to AI applications in response 
to the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, security cameras outfitted 
(“Corporations will increasingly attempt to substitute artificial intelligence (AI) and 
robotics for human labor.”); kevin J. Delaney, The Robot That Takes Your Job Should Pay 
Taxes, Says Bill Gates, quartz.com (Feb. 17, 2017), https://qz.com/911968/bill-gates-the-
robot-that-takes-your-job-should-pay-taxes [https://perma.cc/D3SD-3JXK].
15. Compare Estlund, supra note 8, at 264 (“[B]ecause emerging technologies are 
able to replicate or surpass a wider swath of human capabilities, there is more reason 
this time around to expect job destruction to outpace job creation.”), with H. James Wil-
son & Paul R. Daugherty, Collaborative Intelligence: Humans and AI Are Joining Forces, 
harV. bus. rEV. (July– Aug. 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/07/collaborative-intelligence 
-humans-and-ai-are-joining-forces [https://perma.cc/Z8AK-WJDH] (“While AI will radi-
cally alter how work gets done and who does it, the technology’s larger impact will be in 
complementing and augmenting human capabilities, not replacing them.”).
16. miranda bogEn & aaron riEkE, upturn, hELp wantEd: an EXamination of hiring 
aLgorithms, Equity, and bias 3 (2018), https://www.upturn.org/static/reports/2018/hiring 
-algorithms/files/Upturn%20--%20Help%20Wanted%20-%20An%20Exploration%20
of%20Hiring%20Algorithms,%20Equity%20and%20Bias.pdf.
17. See, e.g., Ifeoma Ajunwa, Beware of Automated Hiring, n.y. timEs (Oct. 8, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/08/opinion/ai-hiring-discrimination.html [https://perma 
.cc/4YKD-9A4E]; Chris Opfer, AI Hiring Could Mean Robot Discrimination Will Head 
to Courts, daiLy Lab. rEp. (bL) (Nov. 12, 2019, 5:01 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw 
.com/daily-labor-report/ai-hiring-could-mean-robot-discrimination-will-head-to-courts 
[https://perma.cc/WCP2-H2E2].
18. Rachel Emma Silverman & Nikki Waller, The Algorithm That Tells the Boss 
Who Might Quit, waLL st. J. (Mar. 13, 2015, 7:05 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the 
-algorithm-that-tells-the-boss-who-might-quit-1426287935 [https://perma.cc/4EE3-4NB4].
19. Vegard Kolbjørnsrud, Richard Amico & Robert J. Thomas, How Artificial Intel-
ligence Will Redefine Management, harV. bus. rEV. (Nov. 2, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/11 
/how-artificial-intelligence-will-redefine-management [https://perma.cc/NK42-J46J] (“The 
fact is, artificial intelligence will soon be able to do the administrative tasks that con-
sume much of managers’ time faster, better, and at a lower cost.”).
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with AI scanners have monitored employees for mask use and social 
distancing.20 
Objections to the use of AI within the employment relationship 
have largely fallen into two categories. First, there has been significant 
concern that the AI may reflect, reinforce, or worsen discriminatory 
biases when making employment decisions. Algorithms can produce 
predictions that systematically disadvantage workers along the lines 
of race, sex, or other protected characteristics.21 The risk is that these 
discriminatory outcomes will be overlooked or ignored because of the 
mistaken belief that AI processes are “objective” and “neutral.” Second, 
the introduction of AI may bring employees into a vortex of massive 
information collection, data vulnerability, and seemingly whimsical 
decision-making. Employees report a feeling of powerlessness when 
AI is given significant power over their jobs, as they lose the ability 
to interact with their “supervisor” in a meaningful way.22 The vora-
cious maw of data collection paired with the inexplicability of decisions 
made can create the feeling that the employee is trapped in a matrix of 
computer-controlled reality from which there is no escape.23 In the 
next two sections we explain these concerns and examine the extent to 
which existing law addresses them.
II. AI and Employment Discrimination
When an employer uses AI tools to make or to aid decisions about 
recruitment, hiring, and promotion, they can have a significant impact 
on access to employment opportunities. The promise of these technol-
ogies is that they will make these HR processes fairer and less dis-
criminatory.24 Human decision-makers often harbor explicit or implicit 
20. Rani Molla, 10 Ways Office Work Will Never Be the Same, rEcodE, (Mar. 23, 2021, 
8:20 AM), https://www.vox.com/recode/22331447/10-ways-office-work-pandemic-future-
remote-work [https://perma.cc/P72F-N8TS]; Matthew Wille, Employers Are Turning to 
AI to Enforce Social Distancing for COVID-19, input (Apr. 28, 2020, 11:01 AM), https://
www.inputmag.com/tech/employers-are-turning-to-ai-to-enforce-social-distancing-covid 
-19-coronavirus[https://perma.cc/CU4Q-YSHA]. 
21. See Dave Gershgorn, Companies Are on the Hook If Their Hiring Algorithms 
Are Biased, quartz (Oct. 22, 2018), https://qz.com/1427621/companies-are-on-the-hook 
-if-their-hiring-algorithms-are-biased [https://perma.cc/WM4W-NNBM] (discussing Ama-
zon test program that consistently chose men over women for positions).
22. Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Limitless Worker Surveillance, 
105 caLif. L. rEV. 735, 737 (2017) (“Employees’ suspicion that OccupEye’s true purpose 
was mass surveillance of worker performance quickly led to public outrage, union pres-
sure, and, ultimately, its ejection from the Telegraph building.”).
23. Deeks, supra note 3, at 1829 (“Because these algorithms repeatedly adjust the 
way that they weigh inputs to improve the accuracy of their predictions, it can be difficult 
to identify how and why the algorithms reach the outcomes they do.”); Andrew D. Selbst 
& Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87 fordham L. rEV. 1085, 
1087 (2018) (“The results of these algorithms can be unnerving, unfair, unsafe, unpre-
dictable, and unaccountable.”).
24. See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller, Can an Algorithm Hire Better Than a Human?, n.y. 
timEs: thE upshot  (June 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/26/upshot/can 
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biases, which can unfairly disadvantage racial minorities, women, and 
other disadvantaged groups,25 and technology might help to avoid those 
human biases.
Despite their aura of neutrality and objectivity, however, AI tools 
can also reproduce human biases or introduce new forms of bias, 
depending upon how such tools are built and trained. Studies have 
documented a number of examples of algorithmic bias. For example, 
Internet searches for black-identified names are more likely to be 
accompanied by ads suggesting an arrest record (e.g., “Latanya Swee-
ney, arrested?”),26 than searches for white-identified names, even when 
no arrest record exists.27 In another well-known example, Amazon 
tried to create an algorithm to screen potential candidates for software 
developer jobs, but abandoned the effort after finding that it systemat-
ically downgraded qualified female applicants.28 
Importantly, these types of discriminatory outcomes cannot be 
prevented simply by removing protected attributes like race or gender 
from the algorithms.29 When AI tools are built using data-rich profiles, 
they can end up relying on proxies for a protected characteristic. For 
example, because place of residence is closely correlated with race in 
many cities, an algorithm that sorts candidates based on zip code could 
disadvantage racial minorities. This might occur intentionally when 
a proxy is used to screen out a disfavored group, but the effect could 
be unintentional as well because attributes can be correlated with 
protected characteristics in unexpected ways. For example, certain 
-an-algorithm-hire-better-than-a-human.html [https://perma.cc/PKM6-4JY4]; Matt 
Richtel, How Big Data Is Playing Recruiter for Specialized Workers, n.y. timEs (Apr. 27, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/28/technology/how-big-data-is-playing-recruiter 
forspecialized-workers.html [https://perma.cc/XAF6-SKXC]; Dustin Volz, Silicon Valley 
Thinks It Has the Answer to Its Diversity Problem, atLantic (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www 
.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/09/silicon-valley-thinks-it-has-the-answer-to-its 
-diversity-problem/431334 [https://perma.cc/VA6N-6W53].
25. For a few of the many articles documenting human bias in the employment 
process, see Jerry Kang & Kristine Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias 
and the Law, 58 ucLa L. rEV. 465, 468–89 (2010); Linda Krieger, The Content of Our 
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity, 47 stan. L. rEV. 1161, 1186–88 (1995); Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton 
Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 caLif. L. rEV. 945, 946 (2006); R. Rich-
ard Banks, Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Lee Ross, Discrimination and Implicit Bias in a 
Racially Unequal Society, 94 caLif. L. rEV. 1169, 1170 (2006).
26. Latanya Sweeney is a prominent computer scientist and professor at Harvard 
University. She conducted the study documenting this effect after a colleague notified 
her that such an ad had appeared when he had Googled her name.
27. Latanya Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery, commc’ns acm, May 
2013, at 44, 46–47.
28. Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon Scraps Secret AI Recruiting Tool That Showed Bias 
Against Women, rEutErs (Oct. 10, 2018, 6:04 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article 
/us-amazon-com-jobs-automation-insight/amazon-scraps-secret-ai-recruiting-tool-that 
-showed-bias-against-women-idUSKCN1MK08G [https://perma.cc/T6NZ-T4ZW].
29. See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 caLif. 
L. rEV. 671, 674 (2016).
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patterns of consumption could be correlated with health conditions, 
causing an algorithm to implicitly discriminate against individuals 
with disabilities, even if the employer neither knows nor intends to 
screen on that basis.30
AI can also produce biased results if it is trained using biased 
data.31 An algorithm trained using the subjective evaluations of a 
biased supervisor will make systematically biased predictions of future 
job performance. Similarly, a hiring algorithm that selects candidates 
by comparing them with an employer’s current employees may dis-
criminate if the employer’s past practices excluded certain groups. If, 
for example, the employer has very few women working as computer 
programmers, the algorithm will likely reproduce that pattern when 
trying to predict the most promising hires. Similarly, an algorithm that 
tried to maximize “cultural fit” by recommending applicants who are 
similar to current employees could operate to exclude racial or ethnic 
minorities.32
Other data problems can also produce biased outcomes. If the data 
used to train the AI is less complete or less accurate for some groups, 
the algorithm will be less accurate in identifying the most promising 
candidates from that group or may systematically underestimate their 
likelihood of success. Similarly, if the training data are unrepresen-
tative of the population to which that the algorithm will be applied, 
it could systematically disadvantage protected groups, even if nei-
ther the creator of the algorithm nor the employer using it intends to 
discriminate.
The risks of biased AI can even affect the diversity of the appli-
cant pool before the employer has a chance to evaluate job candidates.33 
Today, employers rely heavily on online platforms to advertise job 
openings and recruit strong applicants. Those platforms, however, do 
not simply disseminate job postings widely.34 Instead, they rely on AI 
to predict who is most likely to respond to a particular opportunity, and 
those predictions will often reflect past patterns of occupational seg-
30. See Alex Engler, For Some Employment Algorithms, Disability Discrimination by 
Default, brookings (Oct. 31, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/10/31 
/for-some-employment-algorithms-disability-discrimination-by-default [https://perma.cc 
/M7RS-MW5C].
31. For systematic discussions of how algorithms can produce biased results, see 
Barocas & Selbst, supra note 29, at 674; Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at 
Work, 58 wm. & mary L. rEV. 857, 874, 887, 891 (2017) [hereinafter Kim, Data-Driven 
Discrimination]; David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars 
Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 u.c. daVis L. rEV. 653, 703–04 (2017).
32. Ifeoma Ajunwa, The Paradox of Automation as Anti-Bias Intervention, 41 car-
dozo L. rEV. 1671, 1713 (2020).
33. bogEn & riEkE, supra note 16, at 5–6. 
34. Muhammad Ali, Piotr Sapiezynski, Miranda Bogen, Aleksandra Korolova, Alan 
Mislove & Aaron Rieke, Discrimination Through Optimization: How Facebook’s Ad Deliv-
ery Can Lead to Biased Outcomes, 3 proc. acm on hum.-comput. intEraction 1 (2019).
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regation.35 Studies have documented that ads delivered on Facebook 
for stereotypically male jobs (e.g., lumberjack, AI researcher, truck 
driver) are overwhelmingly targeted at male users, even though the 
advertising was intended to reach a gender-balanced audience.36 Other 
types of ads were served to race- or age-biased audiences—again, in 
ways that appear to reflect stereotypes about the kinds of people who 
fill those jobs.37
These risks of discriminatory effects arise because AI learns to 
make predictions by analyzing data about past patterns of behavior. 
In the employment sphere, those patterns may reflect prior discrim-
ination, as, for example, when women are paid less to do the same 
job38 or are discouraged from pursuing certain occupations by on-the-
job harassment. The American labor market has long been character-
ized by patterns of occupational segregation along race and gender 
lines.39 As a result, relying on the past to make predictions about the 
future runs the risk of reproducing past discrimination if care is not 
taken when building AI tools.40 To avoid inadvertently encoding past 
biases, the designers who build AI systems and the employers who use 
them may want to take actions to counter discriminatory effects that 
might otherwise occur. For example, it will often be important to audit 
algorithmic systems for unintended discriminatory effects and make 
adjustments, if necessary, to avoid unfairness.41
Given the risks of discriminatory outcomes, the growing use of AI 
tools in the workplace raises a number of legal questions. Federal laws 
prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, and other protected 
characteristics.42 These laws are relevant when algorithms are used to 
35. Pauline T. Kim, Manipulating Opportunity, 106 Va. L. rEV. 867, 881 (2020).
36. Piotr Sapiezynski, Avijit Ghosh, Levi Kaplan, Alan Mislove & Aaron Rieke, 
Algorithms That “Don’t See Color”: Comparing Biases in Lookalike and Special Ad 
Audiences, arXiV (Dec. 17, 2019), https://arxiv.org/pdf/-1912.07579.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/HG3E-NLCY]; Ava Kofman & Ariana Tobin, Facebook Ads Can Still Discriminate 
Against Women and Older Workers, Despite a Civil Rights Settlement, propubLica (Dec. 13, 
2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-ads-can-still-discriminate 
-against-women-and-older-workers-despite-a-civil-rights-settlement [https://perma.cc 
/F3YU-HCTQ].
37. Ali et al., supra note 34, at 8; Kofman & Tobin, supra note 36.
38. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 622 (2007).
39. kEVin stainback & donaLd tomaskoVic-dEVEy, documEnting dEsEgrEgation: 
raciaL and gEndEr sEgrEgation in priVatE-sEctor EmpLoymEnt sincE thE ciViL rights 
act 7 (2012).
40. Kim, Manipulating Opportunity, supra note 35, at 892.
41. Pauline T. Kim,  Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination, 166 uniV. pa. 
L. rEV. onLinE 189, 190 (2017), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent 
.cgi?article=1212&context=penn_law_review_online.
42. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 expressly forbids discrimination based 
on race, color, religion, national origin and sex, Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 703–716, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15, and the Supreme Court recently interpreted its prohibi-
tions to extend to sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination as well, Bos-
tock v. Clayton Cty., Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1743 (2020). The Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 
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make employment decisions, and in some circumstances their appli-
cation is clear. In other cases, however, it may be quite uncertain how 
existing laws apply to AI tools. 
Consider first employers that use online platforms to advertise 
job openings. Title VII, in addition to prohibiting discrimination, also 
makes it unlawful for employers to publish advertisements that “indi-
cate a preference, limitation, specification or discrimination” based on 
a forbidden characteristic.43 A similar provision in the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act (ADEA) prohibits ads indicating a prefer-
ence based on age.44 These provisions would likely apply if an employer 
deliberately tried to target its ads using attributes that either directly 
or by proxy excluded members of a protected group.45 
However, as discussed above, even neutrally targeted job postings 
can be delivered in biased ways because of the operation of algorithms 
deployed by online platforms. If an employer intends to reach a broad 
audience, but the platform’s algorithm distributes the opportunity in a 
biased way, is the platform responsible? Title VII’s prohibitions apply 
to employment agencies in addition to employers and labor organiza-
tions, but few cases have interpreted that provision. If a tech platform 
actively intervenes to suggest or promote certain candidates or oppor-
tunities, or to facilitate certain matches, we argue that it should be 
treated as an “employment agency” under Title VII.46 Other platforms 
may not have enough direct control over access to employment oppor-
tunities to be covered by the statute.
What about hiring algorithms that sort or score job applicants? 
Does an algorithm that systematically disadvantages members of 
a protected group violate the law? Title VII encompasses two well- 
recognized theories of discrimination: disparate treatment and dis-
parate impact. Disparate treatment theory forbids adverse decisions 
§§ 12101–12117, and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff, 
protect against discrimination on the basis of age, disability, and genetic information, 
respectively.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(b).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 623(e).
45. Pauline T. Kim & Sharion Scott, Discrimination in Online Employment Recruit-
ing, 63 st. Louis uniV. L. J. 93, 94 (2018). The settlement in 2019 of a lawsuit against 
Facebook makes it more difficult for employers to deliberately target its ads on that plat-
form in a way that excludes protected groups. Galen Sherwin & Esha Bhandari, Facebook 
Settles Civil Rights Cases by Making Sweeping Changes to Its Online Ad Platform, ACLU 
(Mar. 19, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/womens-rights/womens-rights-work 
place/facebook-settles-civil-rights-cases-making-sweeping [https://perma.cc/H6D6-UMJ4]. 
Pursuant to the settlement, Facebook agreed to require employment, housing, and credit 
advertisements to be placed through a special portal that restricts the options for tar-
geting these types of ads. Although the restrictions will make it more difficult to deliber-
ately exclude an audience based on a protected characteristic, doing so is still possible. 
Kim, Manipulating Opportunity, supra note 35, at 890–91; see also Miriam A. Cherry, 
Age Discrimination in the On-Demand Economy and Crowdwork, 40 bErkELEy J. Emp. & 
Lab. L. 29, 56–57 (2019).
46. See, Kim, Manipulating Opportunity, supra note 35, at 913.
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taken “because of” race, sex, or any other protected class.47 If an 
employer is using a biased algorithm because it wants to screen out 
members of a protected group, that is clearly a form of intentional dis-
crimination prohibited under disparate treatment theory. Proving the 
employer’s intent may be difficult, but that type of discrimination fits 
quite well conceptually with the disparate treatment theory. 
Disparate impact cases involve facially neutral employment prac-
tices that have discriminatory effects.48 Under current Title VII doc-
trine, disparate impact cases proceed through several steps.49 First, 
the plaintiff must identify an employer practice that has a disparate 
impact on a protected group.50 Then, the employer can defend the prac-
tice by showing that it is “job related” and “consistent with business 
necessity.”51 If the employer succeeds in this defense, the plaintiff can 
still prevail by showing that a less discriminatory alternative exists 
and that the employer failed to adopt it.52
When AI selection tools disproportionately screen out women 
or racial minorities from an applicant pool, disparate impact theory 
would seem to apply. This means employers should closely monitor 
how AI tools operate in practice and should not use them, or should 
discontinue using them, if they have a disparate impact unless they 
are clearly job-related and consistent with business necessity. Apply-
ing these standards, however, raises a number of questions. In the 
past, employers defending selection procedures by validating that they 
actually measured job-relevant skills or attributes.53 AI tools, however, 
often rely on unexplained correlations with observable attributes to 
make predictions about an individual’s future behavior or job perfor-
mance. The variable relied on by the algorithm may have no intuitive 
connection with performance, and, in some cases, the relationship 
may be purely correlational and obviously lack any causal connection 
to the relevant skills or abilities. As examples, it was documented in 
one dataset that computer programmers who frequented a particular 
Japanese manga site had superior coding skills, while another study 
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
48. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971); see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(k).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k).
50. Id. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(A).
51. Id. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(A)(i).
52. Id. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(A)(ii). The ADEA and the ADA do not have provisions com-
parable to 703(k), which sets out these shifting burdens, but they do contain language 
authorizing disparate impact claims based on age and disability. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2); 
42 U.S.C. §12112(b)(3). Some courts, however, have held that disparate impact claims by 
applicants, as opposed to current employees, are not available under the ADEA. Kleber 
v. CareFusion Corp., 914 F.3d 480, 480 (7th Cir. 2019); Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Co., 839 F.3d 958, 970 (11th Cir. 2016).
53. Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures,  29 C.F.R. § 1607.15 
(2020).
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found that users in the United Kingdom who “like” curly fries on Face-
book had higher intelligence.54 Some types of AI use machine learning 
techniques where the AI tools “learn” by extracting patterns from the 
data, rather than the programmer deciding what factors are relevant 
and what weights to give them. The resulting algorithms are often 
exceedingly complex and completely opaque, such that it is difficult for 
humans to interpret. As a consequence, employers that rely on these 
types of algorithms may not be able to clearly articulate or explain the 
reasons for their personnel decisions. Applying existing employment 
discrimination law to AI tools will require addressing these challenges.
When Congress codified the disparate impact doctrine in in sec-
tion 703(k) of Title VII, it retained the language in section 703(a)(2), 
which makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer “to 
limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive” them of 
opportunities because of one of the listed protected characteristics.55 
This statutory language arguably continues to have independent force 
and could serve as a basis for scrutinizing AI systems that sort or 
screen—i.e., “classify”—employees or applicants in biased ways, and 
for ensuring that disparate impact theory meets the novel challenges 
that they pose.56
For discrimination law to remain effective, it must recognize the 
specific ways in which biased AI can unfairly discriminate.57 For exam-
ple, the mere existence of a statistical correlation should not be suf-
ficient to justify a model with discriminatory effects. In other words, 
an unexplained correlation should not satisfy the requirement that an 
employer show that a practice is “job related.”58 In addition, when an 
algorithm systematically disadvantages protected groups, the employer 
should bear the burden of demonstrating that the model is statistically 
valid and substantively meaningful, as opposed to merely “job related.” 
The employer, or the vendor who created the algorithm, should have 
to demonstrate that it avoids common sources of statistical bias—for 
54. Don Peck, They’re Watching You at Work, atLantic (Dec. 2013), https://www.the 
atlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/12/theyre-watching-you-at-work/354681 [perma.cc 
/MAG2-UFAQ]; Michal Kosinski, David Stillwell & Thore Graepel, Private Traits and 
Attributes Are Predictable from Digital Records of Human Behavior, 110  proc. nat’L 
acad. sci. u.s. 5802, 5805 (2013).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2), Parallel language appears in the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 623(a)(2), although it omits “applicants.” The ADA defines discrimination to include 
use of criteria that “have the effect of discrimination,” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3)(a), which 
authorizes disparate impact cases. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 53 (2003).
56. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination, supra note 31, at 857, 916–17.
57. Id. at 886–87.
58. The problem with relying on pure correlations is that the relationship between 
two variables may not be stable over time. A correlation in the past may not hold true in 
the future, which means that applicants could be denied an opportunity on what turns 
out to be an arbitrary, irrelevant basis.
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example, by showing that it was built using data that is accurate, unbi-
ased, and representative. In addition, the employer should have to pro-
vide some explanation of the decision process and explain its relevance 
to the job—something more than a mere statistical relationship. Only 
then can we bring to bear societal values and judgments to determine 
whether an algorithm’s use is justified despite its effects.
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), employers are 
prohibited from using tests or selection criteria “that screen out or tend 
to screen out” individuals with disabilities unless the test or criterion 
is job-related and consistent with business necessity.59 The statute also 
forbids the use of tests that work as obstacles to applicants or employ-
ees with sensory, manual, or speaking impairments, such that they 
“reflect the impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills,” rather than 
the actual skills or aptitude necessary to perform the job.60 In other 
words, employers must be careful when adopting AI screening tools, 
especially ones that collect data about applicants through interactive 
online tests or games, that the tools are not preventing or disadvan-
taging applicants with disabilities that may make it more difficult for 
them to interact online. If that is the case, employers may need to make 
reasonable accommodations for those applicants.
Employers who make use of AI tools in their HR processes should 
be aware of the potential risks of bias and take proactive steps to avoid 
them. Doing so requires careful scrutiny of the manner in which these 
tools are designed and built, and how they will be deployed in a partic-
ular workplace. A number of checklists or principles now offer guidance 
to employers on avoiding bias when using AI tools. For example, the 
Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights has promulgated 
Principles for Hiring Assessment Technologies.61 In addition, because 
algorithms that appear to be unbiased under testing conditions may 
behave differently “in the wild,” employers should engage in regular 
auditing of the performance of these tools once they have been imple-
mented.62 If a screening or hiring tool has an unexpected disparate 
impact on disadvantaged groups, it should be scrutinized and adjusted 
to avoid any unfairness. 
Such an approach is consistent with the Supreme Court’s repeated 
admonition that voluntary compliance by employers is “the preferred 
means of achieving the objectives of Title VII.”63 Although a few 
59. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6).
60. Id. § 12112(b)(7).
61. LEadErship conf. Educ. fund Et aL., ciViL rights principLEs for hiring assEss-
mEnt tEchnoLogiEs (2020), http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/policy/letters/2020/Hiring 
_Principles_FINAL_7.29.20.pdf.
62. See generally Kim, supra note 41. 
63. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 581 (2009) (quoting Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of 
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 510, 515 (1986)).
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commenters have suggested that the Court’s decision in Ricci v. DeSte-
fano64 somehow bars employers from revising algorithmic processes 
after the fact to correct for discrimination,65 this belief stems from a 
misreading of Ricci.66 The Supreme Court in that case disapproved of 
a city’s decision to discard the results of a promotion exam when it 
turned out to have a racially disparate impact. Numerous firefighters 
had expended significant time and resources studying for the exam, 
and its decision to discard the results adversely affected them because 
they had relied on the city’s announced plan to use it for promotions.67 
In contrast, the Court made clear that Title VII does not prohibit an 
employer from prospectively designing its employment practices “in 
order to provide a fair opportunity for all individuals, regardless of 
their race.”68 Thus, it is clearly lawful for an employer to implement 
a new testing protocol or selection procedure in the future to create a 
more fair process.69
III. AI and Employee Privacy and Autonomy
In addition to assisting with traditional HR functions, AI tools are 
also increasingly integrated into work tasks. These tools can offer enor-
mous benefits by helping workers perform their jobs more productive-
ly.70 At the same time, widespread integration of AI into the workplace 
typically entails the collection and analysis of large amounts of data, 
much of it harvested from employees. This massive data collection in 
turn creates new power that employers can use to manage and con-
trol workers.71 As a result, the increasing use of AI at the workplace 
raises concerns about privacy and autonomy. AI threatens employee 
privacy by requiring the collection and processing of huge amounts of 
employee data. And when AI systems make decisions with important 
employment ramifications in the absence of transparency or account-
ability, workers can be left feeling powerless and alienated. Although 
these issues are not new, the growing use of AI tools vastly expands 
64. 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
65. See, e.g., Joshua A. Kroll, Joanna Huey, Solon Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel 
R. Reidenberg, David G. Robinson & Harlan Yu, Accountable Algorithms, 165 u. pa. L. 
rEV. 633, 692 (2017).
66. See Kim, supra note 41, at 197–202 (explaining why Ricci does not prohibit 
employers from correcting algorithms that cause biased outcomes).
67. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 583–84.
68. Id. at 585.
69. See, e.g., Maraschiello v. City of Buffalo Police Dep’t, 709 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2013); 
Carroll v. City of Mount Vernon, 707 F. Supp. 2d 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d, 453 F. App’x 
99 (2d Cir. 2011).
70. See Wilson & Daugherty, supra note 15 (discussing collaborations between 
workers and AI).
71. Ellyn Shook, Eva Sage-Gavin & Susan Cantrell, How Companies Can Use 
Employee Data Responsibly, harV. bus. rEV. (Feb. 15, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/02/how 
-companies-can-use-employee-data-responsibly [perma.cc/SP5N-DKQU]. 
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the challenges they pose, and, to this point, the law provides very few 
mechanisms for directly addressing them.
A. Collection and Use of Employee Data
Data obtained through employee surveillance fuels AI.72 The 
development of artificial intelligence builds on systems that cull and 
process massive amounts of data. AI tools require these large datasets 
in order to learn patterns that allow them to make artificially intel-
ligent decisions. For example, natural language processing systems 
require exposure to enormous samples of human communications to 
analyze and learn to imitate those communications.73 As AI is increas-
ingly incorporated into the workplace, it must rely on data produced 
by humans—employees—for the raw material needed to build tools 
that will be useful in that setting. At the same time, new technologies 
have made monitoring employees and collecting data from them much 
more inexpensive, unobtrusive, and comprehensive. Employers can 
track employee movements,74 follow their activities on the web,75 and 
even monitor employees’ heart rate and blood pressure76 with every-
day technology integrated with ordinary consumer devices.77 Artificial 
intelligence can then crunch this data in a variety of ways, producing 
insights that are unique or unexpected. Below we discuss the ways in 
which the United States and the European Union regulate workplace 
data collection and processing.
72. Calo, supra note 1, at 405 (“The recent explosion of [AI] efficacy comes from a 
combination of much faster computers and much more data.”); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Future 
Work, 2020 uniV. iLL. L. rEV. 889, 897 (“To learn in a sufficiently accurate manner, AI 
programs not only require massive amounts of data, but data that is organized in precise 
ways.”).
73. For example, the pool of emails taken from Enron by the federal government and 
released to the public, known as the Enron Corpus, has been critical in developing speech- 
and language-related AI. See Jessica Leber, The Immortal Life of the Enron E-Mails, 
mit tEch. rEV. (July 2, 2013), https://www.technologyreview.com/2013/07/02/177506/the 
-immortal-life-of-the-enron-e-mails [perma.cc/GTC7-5JR6].
74. See, e.g., David Kravets, Worker Fired for Disabling GPS App That Tracked 
Her 24 Hours a Day, ars tEchnica (May 11, 2015, 9:41 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech 
-policy/2015/05/worker-fired-for-disabling-gps-app-that-tracked-her-24-hours-a-day 
[https://perma.cc/476P-L94B].
75. Frank Pasquale, The Other Big Brother, atLantic (Sept. 21, 2015), https://
www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/corporate-surveillance-activists/406201 
[perma.cc/8QMW-2VYX] (“Employers are monitoring keystrokes, tones of voice, and 
faces, all in the name of predictive analytics.”).
76. Christopher Rowland, With Fitness Trackers in the Workplace, Bosses Can Mon-




77. Stephen Baker, Managing by the Numbers, businEsswEEk, Sept. 8, 2008, at 32, 34.
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1. Employee Privacy Protections Under Current U.S. Law
Commentators have bemoaned the relatively weak constraints 
that U.S. law places on employer collection and use of workers’ data.78 A 
patchwork of variegated protections creates only a loose set of restric-
tions.79 In this part we briefly survey existing legal regulations that 
touch on employee privacy concerns.
General Protections for Employee Privacy. Only a handful of sources 
of law offer broad privacy rights, and they provide quite limited pro-
tections to employees. The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
protects public-sector employees against unreasonable searches and 
seizures,80 but these federal rights only constrain government employ-
ers.81 In addition, because the methods of massive data collection often 
do not involve a search or seizure, it is unclear the extent to which 
constitutional provisions apply in this context.82
The privacy tort of intrusion upon seclusion83 also provides a type 
of generalized privacy protection, and it is recognized by courts in over 
forty states.84 The intrusion tort has provided redress from a variety 
of privacy invasions by employers, such as spying on an employee 
78. See, e.g., Ajunwa, Crawford & Schultz, supra note 22, at 772; Leora Eisenstadt, 
Data Analytics and the Erosion of the Work/Nonwork Divide, 56 am. bus. L.J. 445, 447 
(2019); J.S. Nelson, Management Culture and Surveillance, 43 sEattLE uniV. L. rEV. 631, 
634 (2020).
79. Alan F. Westin, Privacy in the Workplace: How Well Does American Law Reflect 
American Values?, 72 chi.-kEnt L. rEV. 271, 282–83 (1996) (“[T]he U.S. approach to 
privacy remains a more eclectic blend of constitutional interpretation, pin-pointed and 
sector-specific legislation, sector-based administrative agency rules, common-law 
judicial interpretation, labor-management bargaining (where employees are union- 
represented), voluntary organizational policies, and market-based dynamics.”). 
80. . See, e.g., O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725–26 (1987); City of Ontario v. 
Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 756–57 (2010). 
81. Cf. Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the Employment Relation-
ship, 57 ohio st. L.J. 671, 674 n.17 (1996) (“In rare cases, where a private employer is 
acting as an instrument or agent of the government, constitutional privacy protections 
may extend to workers in the private sector.”). Only a handful of states have constitu-
tional or statutory provisions that provide general privacy protections for private sector 
employees. For example, California’s constitutional privacy provision applies to private 
actors. caL. const. art. I, § 1 (providing for “inalienable rights” including “pursuing and 
obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy”); Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 
633, 642–44 (Cal. 1994) (holding that the state’s constitutional right of privacy extends 
to private actors, including private-sector employers); see also mass. gEn. Laws ch. 214, 
§ 1B (2018); nEb. rEV. stat. § 20-203 (2019); r.i. gEn. Laws § 9-1-28.1(a)(1) (2019); wisc. 
stat. ann. § 995.50(2)(a) (2019).
82. The Constitution has also been thought to protect informational privacy, 
although the existence of such a right has not been authoritatively confirmed. See Nat’l 
Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 138 (2011) (assuming, without 
deciding, that employees had a right to informational privacy).
83. Intrusion on seclusion is one of four privacy torts recognized in the rEstatEmEnt 
(sEcond) of torts § 652b (am. L. inst. 1977). The other three privacy torts are public dis-
closure of private fact, id. § 652D; appropriation of another’s name or likeness, id. § 652C; 
and publicity that unreasonably places another in a false light, id. § 652E.
84. rEstatEmEnt of Emp. L. § 7.01 Reporters’ Notes cmt. b, at 296–98 (am. L. inst. 
2015) (discussing states that have adopted the privacy torts).
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who filed a workers’ compensation claim;85 deploying informants to 
collect private information about fellow workers;86 searching a locker 
and personal belongings without consent;87 and installing cameras in 
bathrooms or private offices.88 To be actionable, the employer’s conduct 
must be intentional, must intrude upon the employee’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy, and must be considered “highly offensive to the 
reasonable person.”89 
Although the intrusion tort has successfully protected workers 
against egregious employer practices in the past, it is less likely to be 
effective in protecting employee privacy when large amounts of data 
are scooped up to feed AI systems.90 The type of data collected is often 
not the kind of information that is considered private or sensitive in 
nature, such that its collection would be considered highly offensive. 
Instead, it is often relatively mundane bits of data that employees pro-
duce as they go about their work or daily lives that get its invasive 
power only when aggregated with other data. In addition, employers 
will often be able to argue that this data is the type of information 
that businesses routinely collect, and courts have been fairly deferen-
tial when the employer asserts a business interest justifying the intru-
sion.91 If the data collection and use ultimately improve the employees’ 
performance or the employer’s underlying business, the employer’s 
actions are likely to be adjudged prudent rather than nefarious.
The intrusion tort is also unlikely to provide employees with much 
protection because most employees are employed at will, such that 
their continued employment can be conditioned on consent to data 
collection and use. Employee consent will not always defeat claims of 
privacy intrusion,92 but consent is generally regarded as a defense to 
85. See, e.g., York v. Gen. Elec. Co., 759 N.E.2d 865 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001).
86. See, e.g., Johnson v. K-Mart Corp., 723 N.E.2d 1192 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
87. See, e.g., K-Mart Corp. Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 640–41 (Tex. 
App. 1984).
88. See, e.g., Elmore v. Atl. Zayre, Inc., 341 S.E.2d 905, 906-907 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) 
(bathroom); Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 211 P.3d 1063, 1073 (Cal. 2009) (office).
89. rEstatEmEnt (sEcond) of torts § 652B (am. L. inst. 1977).
90. Pauline T. Kim, Data Mining and the Challenges of Protecting Employee Privacy 
Under U.S. Law, 40 comp. Lab. L. & poL’y J. 405, 416 (2019) (explaining that the common 
law tort doctrine “does not address how data mining can threaten privacy by inferring 
highly personal information rather than collecting it directly”).
91. See Feminist Women’s Health Ctr. v. Super. Ct. of Sacramento Cnty., 61 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 187, 195 (Ct. App. 3d 1997) (finding that a requirement that employees demon-
strate self-cervical exams to clients of the Center was not a privacy intrusion because of 
the employer’s “fundamental goal of educating women about the function and health of 
their reproductive systems”).
92. rEstatEmEnt of Emp. L., § 7.06 cmt. h (am. L. inst. 2015) (“In the employment 
context, employee consent obtained as a condition of obtaining or retaining employment 
is not effective consent to an employer intrusion and does not in itself provide a defense 
. . . .”).
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intentional tort claims.93 Even if consent does not waive the employ-
ees’ rights completely, it still undercuts the “highly offensive” aspect 
of the claim, as the employee agreed to the intrusion. The expanding 
ubiquity of employer monitoring also erodes the privacy expectation of 
employees, making it less likely to be considered an intrusion in the 
first place.94 
In terms of worker surveillance, the employer is generally allowed 
to monitor its employees.95 Even continual electronic observation is 
permitted in many areas of the workplace.96 The states of California, 
Connecticut, and Delaware require employers to give notice when they 
engage in electronic monitoring.97 And, as discussed above, surveillance 
in traditionally private places like bathrooms or employees’ homes can 
give rise to tort liability. The National Labor Relations Act prohibits 
employer surveillance that would chill or otherwise interfere with its 
employees’ protected concerted activity.98 However, apart from these 
laws, employers are generally unrestricted in their ability to monitor 
or surveil their employees, including using electronic tools to collect 
data about their activities.
The common law has determined that surveillance can be tortious 
when conducted at personal locations away from work when done with-
out the employee’s consent.99 However, observation of an employee in 
93. rEstatEmEnt (sEcond) of torts § 892A(1); see Steven L. Willborn, Consent-
ing Employees: Workplace Privacy and the Role of Consent, 66 La. L. rEV. 975, 1008 
(2006) (arguing for the importance of the concept of consent within workplace privacy 
protections).
94. rEstatEmEnt of Emp. L. § 7.03(b) (describing the conditions for finding a reason-
able expectation of privacy).
95. See Ajunwa, Crawford & Schultz, supra note 22, at 747 (“There are no federal 
laws that expressly address employer surveillance or limit the intrusiveness of such 
surveillance.”).
96. See, e.g., Vega-Rodriguez v. P.R. Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174, 184 (1st Cir. 1997) (per-
mitting the use of cameras to continually surveil the employees’ work space).
97. California makes it a misdemeanor to use an electronic tracking device to follow 
the location or movement of a person without her consent. caL. pEnaL codE § 637.7 (West 
2019); see also Kendra Rosenberg, Location Surveillance by GPS: Balancing an Employ-
er’s Business Interest with Employee Privacy, 6 wash. J.L. tEch. & arts 143, 149 (2010). 
Connecticut requires employers to provide prior written notice of the monitoring, conn. 
gEn. stat. § 31-48d(b)(1) (2020); Gerardi v. City of Bridgeport, 985 A.2d 328, 335 (Conn. 
2010) (prohibiting an employer from electronically monitoring an employee’s activities 
without prior notice). Delaware requires advance written notice that the employee must 
then acknowledge. dEL. codE ann. tit. 19, § 705 (2020).
98. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1); see Charlotte Garden, Labor Organizing in the Age of Sur-
veillance, 63 st. Louis uniV. L.J. 55, 60 (2018) (noting that “certain surveillance activities 
by employers have been illegal since the earliest days of the NLRA”).
99. See Ass’n Servs., Inc. v. Smith, 549 S.E.2d 454, 463 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (employer 
trespassed onto employee property); Saldana v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 443 N.W.2d 382, 384 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (finding intrusion (but no liability) when investigator took pictures 
inside employee’s home using a telephoto lens); see also Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel 
Corp., 502 A.2d 1101, 1117 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (holding that the use of a listening 
device within personal areas is generally actionable); Burns v. Masterbrand Cabinets, 
Inc., 874 N.E.2d 72, 77 (Ill. App. 2007) (remanding for further proceedings on intrusion 
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public is permitted.100 Federal law forbids an employer from intercept-
ing an employee’s telephone or other electronic communications, even 
from the employer’s phone, without specific consent.101 Surveillance can 
be legally problematic under the common law if undisclosed, but secrecy 
is generally permissible when employed for significant and legitimate 
business reasons, such as to catch a thief.102 Once again, data collection 
is generally permitted if disclosed to employees, and they consent.
Protections for Specific Types of Data. Beyond these general pri-
vacy protections are variegated statutory and regulatory provisions 
that protect specific types of data. However, because these provisions 
focus on particular kinds of information that are deemed sensitive in 
some way, they provide only very patchy protections against compre-
hensive data collection.
No law broadly regulates the privacy of employees’ health infor-
mation, although the ADA limits employers’ ability to conduct med-
ical exams or make medical inquiries, and the Genetic Information 
Nondisclosure Act (GINA) prohibits employers from requesting or 
acquiring employees’ genetic information.103 Although many assume 
that the federal Health Information Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA)104 protects employee medical information, HIPAA only 
claim when the employer’s investigator secretly videotaped an employee in his home 
after gaining entry on false pretenses).
100. See, e.g., ICU Investigations, Inc. v. Jones, 780 So. 2d 685, 693 (Ala. 2000) (no 
intrusion when videotaped in front yard); York v. Gen. Elec. Co., 759 N.E.2d 865, 866 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (no intrusion when employer representative observed the employee 
arriving at work, going into his chiropractor’s office, visiting a lawnmower repair shop, 
mowing his lawn, and riding a motorcycle).
101. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (criminalizing the actions of a person who “intentionally 
intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor 
to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication”). The intercept is not illegal if 
one of the parties (namely, the employee) consents to it. Id. § 2511(2)(c). However, courts 
have not been disposed to find implied consent. Watkins v. L.M. Berry, 704 F.2d 577, 581 
(11th Cir. 1983) (notice as to employer policy of interception did not establish consent). 
Furthermore, a “business extension” exception allows for monitoring “in the ordinary 
course of business.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(i). However, listening in to personal calls is not 
generally within the ordinary course of business. See Watkins, 704 F.2d at 583. Wiretap-
ping is also problematic under state common law. See Narducci v. Village of Bellwood, 444 
F. Supp. 2d 924, 938 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (“Eavesdropping via wiretapping has been conspicu-
ously singled out on several occasions as precisely the kind of conduct that gives rise to 
an intrusion-on-seclusion claim.”).
102. See Marrs v. Marriott Corp., 830 F. Supp. 274, 283 (D. Md. 1992) (permitting 
secret videotaping after hours to uncover thief); Sacramento Cty. Deputy Sheriffs’ Assoc. 
v. County of Sacramento, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834, 847 (Ct. App. 1997) (theft of inmates’ 
property justified secret surveillance). But see Acuff v. IBP, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 914, 927 
(C.D. Ill. 1999) (videotaping nurse’s office during medical exams not justified by concerns 
about theft).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (ADA limitation on examinations); 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff–1(b) 
(making it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer to request, require, or 
purchase genetic information with respect to an employee”).
104. Health Information Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 
110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
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applies to health plans, health care providers, and health care clear-
inghouses.105 Employers are not covered entities unless they fall into 
one of these categories.106 And, even if they are covered, employers need 
not comply with HIPAA when it comes to records held in their role as 
employer.107 If the information does fall under HIPAA, patient autho-
rization generally provides permission to collect and use the protected 
health information.108
Illinois provides a private right of action for improper collection, 
retention, or use of biometric data such as fingerprints or facial scans 
in the Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA).109 Although the BIPA 
allows employers to collect biometric information with employee con-
sent, the statutory scheme also provides a number of protections and 
limitations on the use of the data. Employers have been sued for failing 
to notify employees about the purpose and length of the data’s use; 
neglecting to establish a timeline for destruction of the data; and fail-
ing to obtain employee consent for disclosure or dissemination of the 
biometric data to a third party.110 Other states have also begun to enact 
limitations on the collection and use of biometric data, although it is 
not always clear if these state statutes apply to employment, and many 
do not provide private rights of action.111 Like the BIPA, these statutes 
105. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2020) (defining covered entity as a health plan, a health 
care clearinghouse, or a health care provider). 
106. See id. §§ 164.103, 164.105; Sharona Hoffman, Employing E-Health: The 
Impact of Electronic Health Records on the Workplace, 19 kan. J.L. & pub. poL’y 409, 419 
(2010) (“Employers who are self-insured can receive medical information from providers 
for payment purposes without their employees’ authorization. Such employers are con-
sidered ‘hybrid’ entities whose business activities include both covered (insurance) and 
non-covered (employment) functions.”).
107. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. In addition, covered entities may provide employee 
health information to employers in order “[t]o evaluate whether the individual has a 
work-related illness or injury.” Id. § 164.512(b)(v)(A)(2); see also id. § 164.504(f) (noting 
that as a condition of providing the information, the covered entity must require the 
employer to protect the information and not use it for employment-related actions).
108. What Is the Difference Between “Consent” and “Authorization” Under the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule?, u.s. dEp’t hEaLth & hum. sErVs. (2013), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa 
/for-professionals/faq/264/what-is-the-difference-between-consent-and-authorization 
/index.html [https://perma.cc/B64H-APE5].
109. Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 iLL. comp. stat. §§ 14/1–/99 (2018).
110.  Corrado Rizzi, Illinois Wendy’s Operator Hit with BIPA Class Action over 
Employee Fingerprint Scans, cLassaction.org (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.classaction 
.org/news/illinois-wendys-operator-hit-with-bipa-class-action-over-employee-finger-
print-scans [https://perma.cc/PSQ9-BCG6] (describing O’Sullivan v. All-Star, Inc., No. 
2019CH11575, filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, on Oct. 7, 2019). Third-
party vendors may also be liable to employees for failing to obtain consent. Figueroa v. 
Kronos, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 3d 772, 782 (N.D. Ill. 2020).
111. See, e.g., tEX. bus. & com. codE ann. § 503.001 (West 2019) (requiring consent 
for the capture of a biometric identifier and sale of biometric data, as well as reasonable 
care in storage and disposal, but without a private right of action); wash. rEV. codE 
§19.375.020 (2019) (regulating use of biometric data in commercial databases and fore-
going a private right of action). 
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are narrowly limited in the types of information that are protected and 
apply only within the state’s borders.
The federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) regulates employers’ 
access to applicants’ or employees’ credit reports. The statute requires 
employers to get written authorization to obtain employee credit 
reports; employers must also notify employees if the credit report is used 
to take adverse action against them.112 The FCRA applies only when 
employers receive or use consumer reports from consumer reporting 
agencies, but the term consumer report is construed broadly to include 
any information that goes to “character, general reputation, personal 
characteristics, or mode of living.”113 Because the FCRA largely focuses 
on procedural requirements of notice and consent, employers can gen-
erally avoid liability under the Act if they comply with the details of 
the statutory scheme.114
Although relatively narrow in scope, state statutes also regulate 
the use of specific types of information within the employment relation-
ship. Twenty-six states have laws prohibiting employers from request-
ing access to applicants’ or employees’ private social-media accounts.115 
And a number of states and municipalities have passed “ban the box” 
laws that prohibit employers from requesting information about prior 
arrests or convictions at certain early points in the hiring process.116 
Artificial intelligence that relies on employee data also raises con-
cerns about the security of the data that has been collected. The ADA 
and GINA require employers to keep any medical or genetic informa-
tion they lawfully acquired in a secure and confidential manner.117 
112. See Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(b)(1)–(3), 1681m; see 
also N.Y. Fair Credit Reporting Act, N.Y. gEn. bus. L. § 380-b (2020) (regulating the use 
of credit reports). 
113. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1).
114. See Pauline T. Kim & Erika Hanson, People Analytics and the Regulation of 
Information Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 61 st. Louis uniV. L.J. 17, 20 (2016) 
(“[A]lthough employers face significant liability risks if they disregard the statute’s 
requirements, the FCRA in fact does little to curb invasive data collection practices or to 
address the risks of discriminatory algorithms.”).
115. See, e.g., ark. codE ann. § 11-2-124 (2019); caL. Labor codE § 980 (2019); 
coLo. rEV. stat. § 8-2-127 (2019); 820 iLL. comp. stat. § 55/10 (2018); La. rEV. stat. ann. 
§ 51:1953 (2018); md. codE ann., Lab. & Emp. § 3-712 (2019); mich. comp. Laws § 37.273 
(2018); nEV. rEV. stat. § 613.135 (2019); n.h. rEV. stat. ann. § 275:74 (2018); n.J. stat. 
ann. § 34:6B-5 (2019); n.m. stat. ann. § 50-4-34 (2019); okLa. stat. tit. 40, § 173.2 (2018); 
or. rEV. stat. § 659A.330 (2019); 28 r.i. gEn. Laws § 28-56-3 (2018); tEnn. codE ann. 
§ 50-1-1003 (West 2019); utah codE ann. § 34-48-201 (West 2019); wash. rEV. codE § 
49.44.200 (2019); wis. stat. § 995.55 (2019). Roughly half of the states had such legisla-
tion under consideration. See Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords, nat’L 
conf. of statE LEgisLaturEs (July 1, 2020), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommuni-
cations-and-information-technology/employer-access-to-social-media-passwords-2013.
aspx [https://perma.cc/6X5P-KVFA].
116. See, e.g., mass. gEn. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(9), (9A) (2018); see also Dallan F. Flake, 
Do Ban-the-Box Laws Really Work?, 104 iowa L. rEV. 1079, 1079 (2019) (providing empir-
ical examination of ban-the-box laws).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 2000-ff(a).
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All fifty states have data breach notification laws that would apply 
to employers when a data breach involves employee personal data.118 
Statutory schemes such as HIPAA and Illinois BIPA impose security 
requirements on certain types of information.119 Tort claims against 
employers for faulty or negligent data security systems have met with 
mixed success.120 
2.  Protecting Workplace Privacy under a Data  
Protection Framework
American law has tended to follow a privacy rights approach that 
focuses on prohibiting particular types of intrusions or shielding cer-
tain kinds of information, but this framework has created only limited 
restrictions on employers’ ability to collect data about applicants and 
workers. In Europe, however, the focus has been on data protection 
more broadly, relying on principles that apply across sectors and types 
of information. The data protection model of the European Union (EU) 
aims to restrict the collection, use, and disclosure of personal informa-
tion except where justified, and does so by creating rights in individ-
ual data subjects to enforce those restrictions. The EU’s General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) is a paradigmatic example of a compre-
hensive data protection regime.121 Its scope, requirements for process-
ing data, and muscular enforcement regime empower individuals with 
important rights over the use of their data.122
118. Security Breach Notification Laws, nat’L conf. of statE LEgisLaturEs (July 17, 
2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology 
/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/8PX7-DFTS].
119. HIPAA regulations require that covered entities “protect against any reason-
ably anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity” of protected health infor-
mation. 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a)(2) (2020); 740 iLL. comp. stat. 14/5 (2008).
120. See Corona v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., No. 14-CV-09600 RGK EX, 2015 WL 
3916744, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2015) (class-action lawsuit filed against Sony Pic-
tures for failing to prevent hack of 100 terabytes of employee data). The suit was settled. 
Assoc. Press, Sony Pictures Settles with Former Workers in Data Breach Lawsuit, waLL 
st. J. (Sept. 2, 2015, 8:49 PM ET), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sony-pictures-settles-with 
-former-workers-in-data-breach-lawsuit-1441241363 [https://perma.cc/VC32-W5TX]. But 
see Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 550, 558 (Minn. 2003) (finding 
no liability when social security numbers were faxed out to sixteen different business 
locations); Allison v. Aetna, Inc., No. 09–2560, 2010 WL 3719243 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2010) 
(dismissing complaint for lack of standing due to the absence of any injury in fact to 
employees after data breach).
121. Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Per-
sonal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/
EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) (EU) [hereinafter GDPR]. 
An easily accessible version of the GDPR can be found at Intersoft Consulting, GDPR, 
https://gdpr-info.eu/. The GDPR is intended to protect “fundamental rights and freedoms 
of natural persons and in particular their right to the protection of personal data.” Id. 
art. 1(2).
122. See, e.g., Anupam Chander, Margot E. Kaminski & William McGeveran, Cat-
alyzing Privacy Law, 105 minn. L. rEV. 1733, 1734 (2021) (noting that the GDPR “posi-
tioned the European Union as the world’s privacy champion”).
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The GDPR applies to all processing of personal data,123 including 
by employers. The broad definition of personal data124 means that all 
information collected by an employer about applicants and employees 
is covered as long as it is connected to an identifiable person. Any pro-
cessing—including collection, use, or disclosure—of personal data must 
have a legal justification.125 Although data processing can be justified 
by the consent of the data subject in certain circumstances, consent 
is not considered valid “where there is a clear imbalance between the 
data subject and the controller.”126 The employment relationship is 
understood to be one example of such a “clear imbalance.”127 Employer 
collection and use of employee data must therefore be justified by basic 
requirements of the work relationship or the legitimate needs of the 
employer, rather than by relying on consent. 
Where the processing of employee data is necessary, the GDPR 
asks employers to take steps to mitigate the effects on employees—for 
example, by monitoring only in specific places and not sensitive areas, 
or collecting data by sampling rather than continuous monitoring.128 
The EU privacy agency’s guidance on the workplace provides exam-
ples of illegitimate employer uses of employee data: when monitoring 
123. GDPR, supra note 121, art. 3(1) (applying to “the processing of personal data 
in the context of the activities of an establishment of a controller or a processor in the 
Union, regardless of whether the processing takes place in the Union or not”); id. art. 
4(2) (defining processing to mean “any operation or set of operations which is performed 
on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such 
as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, 
retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise mak-
ing available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction”).
124. Id. art. 4(1) (defining personal data to mean “any information relating to an 
identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is 
one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier 
such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or 
more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or 
social identity of that natural person”).
125. Id. art. 6. The GDPR lists a number of specified criteria for lawful processing 
of personal data. Id.
126. Id. Recital 43(1). Recitals are nonbinding but offer important guidance. See 
Margot E. Kaminski, The Right to Explanation, Explained, 34 bErkELEy tEch. L.J. 189, 
193–94 (2019) (“The GDPR consists of both text (Articles) and an extensive explanatory 
preamble. The preambular provisions, known as Recitals, do not have the direct force of 
law in the EU. . . . [T]hey are not binding law, but they are often cited as authoritative 
interpretations where the GDPR is vague.”).
127. In its interpretive guidance of the GDPR as applied to the workplace, the Arti-
cle 29 Working Party—the earlier title for the European Union agency responsible for 
data protection—stated that “for the majority of such data processing at work, the legal 
basis cannot and should not be the consent of the employees (Art [6](a)) due to the nature 
of the relationship between employer and employee.” Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party, Opinion 2/2017 on Data Processing at Work, 17/EN WP 249 (June 8, 2017), http://
ec.europa.eu/newsroom/document.cfm?doc_id=45631 [hereinafter WP Work Opinion]. 
The Article 29 Working Party is now known as the European Data Protection Board. 
GDPR, supra note 121, art. 68.
128. WP Work Opinion, supra note 127, at 7–8.
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designed to protect employee safety is used for job-evaluation purposes; 
when a CCTV system is used to regularly monitor employee behavior; 
or when geolocation data is used to continuously track an employee’s 
movements and actions.129
The GDPR also gives data subjects two sets of rights: rights to 
know about the processing, and rights to affect the processing. Data 
processors, including employers, are required to disclose information 
about the processing in clear and accessible language.130 This informa-
tion includes the categories of data collected, the purpose of and legal 
basis for the processing, how the data will be used and/or disclosed, 
and the procedures for challenging these processes.131 Rights affecting 
data processing include the right to correct inaccurate data, the right 
to supplement incomplete data,132 and the right to request deletion of 
data under some circumstances.133
The GDPR thus represents a very different model for the regu-
lation of employee data collection and use. It is comprehensive in 
scope, requires specific justifications for data collection, limits data 
use beyond the original purpose, and provides individuals with specific 
rights regarding the collection and use of their personal data. Although 
the GDPR applies to data about individuals located in the EU, it is hav-
ing significant impact worldwide. In part, its influence arises from the 
fact that data flows often are not limited by political boundaries, but 
the GDPR also sets an example that influences lawmaking elsewhere. 
In the United States, it has been suggested as a blueprint for federal 
privacy legislation and has already influenced state law. The California 
Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), which went into effect in 2020, provides 
important notification requirements on the collection and processing 
of personal data, as well as the right to delete certain data and opt out 
of third party transfers.134 Voters passed the California Privacy Rights 
Act (CPRA) in fall 2020; the CPRA will enhance consumers’ ability to 
correct inaccurate information, limit the use of sensitive data, expand 
the private right of action, and create an independent state agency for 
privacy regulation.135 Both of these Acts, however, have limited impact 
129. Id. at 10.
130. GDPR, supra note 121, art. 12.
131. Id. art. 13, 15.
132. Id. art. 16.
133. Id. art. 17(1). Exceptions apply for information that involves freedom of expres-
sion, public health, or research/archiving. Id. art. 17(3). The controller must also provide 
data subjects with the right to a portable version of the data, in a commonly-used and 
machine-readable format, when the processing is automated and conducted pursuant to 
the data subject’s consent or contract. Id. art. 20.
134. caL. ciV. codE § 1798.140(o) (West 2020).
135. The California Privacy Rights Act of 2020, Proposition 24 (Cal. 2020). In March 
2021 Virginia passed a consumer privacy statute similar to but less restrictive than 
the CCPA. Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act, H.B. 2307, S.B. 1392 (Va. Mar. 2, 
2021), https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?212+sum+HB2307; Cat Zakrzewski, 
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on employment; the CCPA currently has a specific exception that 
excludes employee data from coverage.136
Following the EU’s data protection model would be a dramatic 
departure from the current U.S. approach to employee privacy. Only a 
patchwork of laws currently restrict employers’ ability to collect data 
from and about their employees. Employers in the United States face 
only limited prohibitions on the collection of employee data, and com-
paratively miniscule restrictions on how they use data once it has been 
collected. They may not use information about individual workers to 
discriminate on the basis of protected characteristics or to retaliate 
against them for exercising statutory rights, but, beyond that, employ-
ers are generally free to use the information they have about employees 
however they wish. They may aggregate and analyze worker data to 
infer new information about their employees.137 And U.S. law generally 
neither limits employers to only using data for the purpose for which it 
was collected nor requires that they ensure the accuracy of the data.138 
B. AI Accountability and Transparency in the Workplace
Distinct from employees’ interests in limiting collection and use 
of their personal information is the growing push for greater trans-
parency, accountability, and explainability in algorithmic processes.139 
Although not part of traditional “privacy” concerns, these values are 
Virginia Governor Signs Nation’s Second State Consumer Privacy Bill, wash. post 
(Mar. 2, 2021 7:17 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/03/02/privacy 
-tech-data-virgina.
136. caL. ciV. codE § 1798.145(m)(1) (excluding personal information collected “by 
a business about a natural person in the course of the natural person acting as . . . an 
employee of . . . that business”). This exclusion is set to expire on January 1, 2023. Id. 
§ 1798.145(m)(4). The CCPA still requires the employer to provide notice of data collec-
tion to its employees; this notice must include the type of personal information collected 
and its intended use. See id. §§ 1798.145(m)(3); 1798.100(b). And employers must ade-
quately protect data they collect, as employees may bring suit in the event of a data 
breach. See id. §§ 1798.145(m)(3); 1798.150(a)(1).
137. For example, relatively trivial information can reveal sensitive information 
such as whether an individual is pregnant or trying to conceive. In one example, Tar-
get used a wide variety of personal data—both generated by the store and purchased 
from external vendors—to develop consumer profiles including particular needs such 
as a pregnancy. Charles Duhigg, How Your Shopping Habits Reveal Even the Most Per-
sonal Information, n.y. timEs, Feb. 19, 2012, (Mag.), at 1. Employers have successfully 
developed similar profiles. Valentina Zarya, Employers Are Quietly Using Big Data to 
Track Employee Pregnancies, forbEs (Feb. 17, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/02/17/cast 
light-pregnancy-data [https://perma.cc/TK37-YF3U].
138. Matthew T. Bodie, Miriam A. Cherry, Marcia L. McCormick & Jintong Tang, 
The Law & Policy of People Analytics, 88 uniV. coLo. L. rEV. 961, 1001–02 (2017). The 
U.S. government is restricted as to secondary uses of data. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 
5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(3)(B). The FCRA does regulate use but its requirements are largely 
procedural. See Kim & Hanson, supra note 114, at 33 (arguing that the FCRA is “ill 
equipped to . . . curb the use of unfair or discriminatory algorithms”).
139. FPF EXpErt’s guidE, supra note 5, at 22. 
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partially addressed through broader approaches to data regulation.140 
Moreover, these values resonate with employee concerns about the 
increasing use of AI within the workplace. It is not just that data is 
constantly vacuumed from employees; it is that the data is then put to 
use to make decisions about them that can appear arbitrary or severe, 
with no opportunity for employee recourse.141 Their vulnerability to 
observation and scrutiny thus heightens their vulnerability to capri-
cious and sudden managerial discretion. Workers can feel that they are 
cogs within a massive and impersonal machine.
U.S. law currently does little to ensure the accountability and 
transparency of artificial intelligence.142 If anything, it reinforces the 
hidden nature of AI processes through trade secret protections.143 
Some reformers have proposed that AI processes be accountable and 
made transparent through mandates requiring entities that use these 
systems to conduct algorithmic impact assessments (AIA).144 Others 
have argued that incentivizing the use of more appropriate and less 
error-ridden algorithmic tools may be preferable to creating new indi-
vidual rights to challenge machine decisions.145 But, although proposed 
legislation has included transparency and accountability requirements, 
currently no American laws comprehensively regulate the use of AI in 
decision-making.
Once again, the GDPR suggests an alternative model. It specif-
ically addresses AI decision-making by requiring disclosure of auto-
mated decision-systems and restricting their use, even allowing data 
subjects to opt out of fully automated profiling. Article 22 states, “The 
data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based 
solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces 
140. See Calo, supra note 1, at 424 (“Why label the question of asymmetric access to 
data a ‘privacy’ question? I do so because privacy ultimately governs the set of responsi-
ble policy outcomes that arise in response to the data parity problem.”).
141. See id. at 423 (“Again, the privacy conversation has evolved to focus not on the 
capacity of the individual to protect their data, but on the power over an individual or 
group that comes from knowing so much about them.”).
142. See Kaminski, supra note 126, at 191–92 (noting that the literature on AI in 
the United States “has been largely speculative, operating in a policy vacuum”).
143. See, e.g., pasquaLE, supra note 2, at 12–15; Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and 
Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 stan. L. rEV. 1343, 
1353 (2018) (arguing against companies invoking trade secret law to avoid scrutiny of 
their AI by criminal defendants).
144. diLLon rEisman, Jason schuLtz, katE crawford & mErEdith whittakEr, 
ai now, aLgorithmic impact assEssmEnts: a practicaL framEwork for pubLic agEncy 
accountabiLity 16 (2018), https://ainowinstitute.org/aiareport2018.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/Y7V4-FWE2].
145. See, e.g., Huq, supra note 2, at 687 (arguing that a “well-calibrated machine 
decision maker may have underappreciated advantages that sound in dignity and auton-
omy terms”).
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legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects 
him or her.”146 Profiling is described as 
any form of automated processing of personal data evaluating the 
personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to anal-
yse or predict aspects concerning the data subject’s performance at 
work, economic situation, health, personal preferences or interests, 
reliability or behaviour, location or movements, where it produces 
legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects 
him or her.147 
The restriction does have two significant exceptions: one if the pro-
cessing is necessary to performance of a contract, and another if the 
individual gives “explicit consent.”148 While these exceptions seem to 
relieve employers of the requirements of Article 22, they are not as 
broad in the employment context as they may appear. “Necessary” to 
contractual performance means that the performance must be impos-
sible without the automated processing, and, as discussed earlier, the 
consent exception is generally unavailable to employers.149 Given the 
newness of the GDPR, and in particular the protections in Article 22,150 
it remains to be seen how potent this right will be in restricting the use 
of predictive AI. It is possible that entities that use machine learning 
(ML) tools will simply put a human nominally in charge at the end 
of the process to rubber-stamp the decision in order to argue that the 
decision is not “based solely on automated processing” and therefore 
falls outside the regulation.151 
Employees arguably have a stronger interest in challenging auto-
mated processing than consumers, because they are more likely to 
feel its effects keenly when it is used to manage and discipline them. 
146. GDPR, supra note 121, art. 12(1).
147. Id. Recital 71.
148. Id. art. 12(2).
149. Lee A. Bygrave, Article 22 Automated Individual Decision-Making, Includ-
ing Profiling, in thE Eu gEnEraL data protEction rEguLation (gdpr): a commEntary 
§ C.4.3, at 522, 537 (Christopher Kuner, Lee A. Bygrave & Christopher Docksey eds., 
2020) (noting that Article 22’s consent derogation “must otherwise be applied in light of 
the definition of consent in Article 4(11)”).
150. Id. § A, at 526 (“The travaux préparatoires to the GDPR provide scant explana-
tion of the rationale and policy underpinnings for Article 22.”).
151. See, e.g., What Does the GDPR Say About Automated Decision-Making and 
Profiling?, U.K. info. comm’r’s off., https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data 
-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/automated-decision 
-making-and-profiling/what-does-the-gdpr-say-about-automated-decision-making-and 
-profiling [https://perma.cc/P5KP-JEJ8] (“Solely means a decision-making process that 
is totally automated and excludes any human influence on the outcome. . . . A process 
won’t be considered solely automated if someone weighs up and interprets the result of 
an automated decision before applying it to the individual.”).
For a discussion of “human in the loop” systems, see Ge Wang, Humans in the Loop: 
The Design of Interactive AI Systems, stanford hai (oct. 20, 2019), https://hai.stanford 
.edu/blog/humans-loop-design-interactive-ai-systems [https://perma.cc/5VJC-TMTE] 
(discussing systems that incorporate human judgment within the process). 
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However, current U.S. law offers no clear vehicles for raising such 
challenges. So far, legal reform and enforcement efforts have largely 
focused on consumer interests, as seen in recent consumer-focused 
state privacy statutes and the Federal Trade Commission’s consumer- 
oriented enforcement against unfair trade practices. Even if the law 
were to create stronger data protection rights for workers, they may 
not be able to effectively assert those rights in the absence of effective 
vehicles for them to exercise voice and power in the workplace. Thus, 
meaningful protections of employees’ privacy and autonomy interests 
around predictive AI tools will likely require not only legal change, but 
enhanced worker power through collective activity as well. 
Conclusion
Current U.S. law is ill-equipped to manage the challenges posed by 
the increasing use of artificial intelligence within the workplace. While 
some existing legal rules shield workers from discrimination and pro-
tect employee privacy and autonomy, the law lacks a comprehensive 
framework for addressing the particular risks of harm posed when 
machine learning tools are applied to manage workers. As AI becomes 
more integrated and essential to business, the law will need to adapt in 
order to effectively prevent discrimination, protect privacy, and redress 
concerns about worker alienation and loss of personal security. 
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